Introduction
Nearly three decades after the signing of the 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord, the region remains caught between the promise of political settlement and the persistence of militarised governance. The Chittagong Hill Tracts, home to the Indigenous Jumma peoples, were formally recognised as requiring a special administrative arrangement under the Accord. Yet in 2025, the political and institutional structures envisioned in that agreement remain largely unrealised.
The transition to a Yunus-led interim government generated cautious expectations of political reform, constitutional review, and renewed political dialogue on unresolved conflicts. At the international level, Bangladesh continues to engage with United Nations mechanisms and presents itself as undergoing a period of democratic restructuring. However, developments reported from the ground in the CHT suggest a different reality marked by entrenched militarisation, land dispossession, criminalisation of Indigenous activists, and recurring communal violence.
These developments raise broader questions about the relationship between national reform narratives and the lived experiences of Indigenous communities in peripheral regions, particularly as Indigenous representatives continue to bring attention to these issues through international advocacy networks. More broadly, the situation illustrates the persistent tension between state-led narratives of stability and the structural grievances of communities living in politically marginalised frontier regions. This article examines the geopolitical foundations of the CHT conflict, the implications of Bangladesh’s recent political transition, and the widening gap between international perceptions of reform and the realities experienced by Indigenous communities on the ground.
The Unfinished Peace: The 1997 Accord and Its Implementation Gap
The 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord was signed between the Government of Bangladesh and the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) with the aim of ending decades of armed conflict through political accommodation. The Accord envisioned devolved authority to the CHT Regional Council and Hill District Councils, resolution of land disputes, rehabilitation of internally displaced Jumma families, and the gradual withdrawal of temporary military camps.
According to the PCJSS Annual Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 2025, two thirds of the Accord, including core provisions, remain unimplemented. Even under the Yunus-led interim administration, no significant progress has been made in transferring meaningful authority to regional institutions or resolving longstanding land disputes. Meetings of implementation bodies have been convened, yet tangible outcomes remain limited.
The persistence of this implementation gap reflects the geopolitical sensitivity of the CHT as a border region adjacent to India and Myanmar. Successive governments have historically prioritised territorial control and security management over decentralisation and regional autonomy. As a result, the Accord continues to function as a formal political commitment that has not yet been translated into structural transformation on the ground.
Militarisation as a Governance Framework
The CHT continues to be governed through a strong security lens. The 2025 PCJSS report documents 268 incidents of human rights violations affecting 606 Jumma individuals. These incidents include eight killings, 117 arrests, widespread house searches, physical assaults, and 26 cases of sexual violence. At least 300 acres of land were reportedly occupied by settlers or external companies during the year. Military and paramilitary operations were conducted in 193 Jumma-inhabited villages.
Such patterns suggest that militarisation in the CHT functions not only as a security response but also as a mode of governance. Reports describe restrictions on movement, limitations on market access, and heightened surveillance in certain areas, particularly affecting the Bawm community in the context of operations linked to the Kuki-Chin National Front. Collective suspicion directed at entire communities reinforces the perception that Indigenous populations are treated as security subjects rather than political stakeholders.
This governance model shapes economic life, political participation, and daily mobility throughout the region. It also complicates the implementation of the Accord, which was premised on reducing the security footprint and strengthening civilian administration. As long as governance remains anchored in a securitised framework, the prospects for meaningful decentralisation and trust-building between Indigenous communities and the state remain limited.
Land, Development Projects, and International Scrutiny
Land remains central to the conflict. Historical dispossession linked to state-sponsored settlement policies has never been fully addressed, and the Land Dispute Resolution Commission has not effectively resolved competing claims. At the same time, new development initiatives involving plantations, tourism, and infrastructure have intensified pressure on Indigenous territories.
In 2025, United Nations Special Procedures issued Joint Allegation Letters concerning developments in the CHT. One communication addressed a private company in relation to a tourism project in the Chimbuk area of Bandarban. The letter raised concerns about the displacement of Mro Indigenous communities, environmental impacts, and the absence of free, prior and informed consent. Another communication addressed the Government of Bangladesh, detailing allegations of militarisation, restrictions on traditional livelihood practices such as jhum cultivation, arbitrary arrests, and collective punishment practices affecting Indigenous communities.
The issuance of these letters indicates growing international attention to the situation in the Hills. However, Joint Allegation Letters are non-binding and depend on state cooperation. While they contribute to documentation and visibility, they do not automatically alter structural conditions on the ground. The tension between international scrutiny and local continuity of practices underscores the limits of external accountability mechanisms.
Political Transition and the Question of Inclusion
The Yunus-led interim government initiated discussions on constitutional reform and institutional restructuring. For religious and national minorities, including Indigenous peoples, this political transition created expectations of greater inclusion. However, the PCJSS report notes that Indigenous representatives were not meaningfully included in constitutional reform processes. No dedicated Minority Commission was established, and no explicit commitments were made to accelerate implementation of the CHT Accord.
Attempts to advance Accord-related initiatives have also reportedly faced resistance from organised settler groups that oppose aspects of the agreement. Such mobilisation reflects ongoing contestation over the political status of the region and the distribution of authority between central and regional institutions.
As Bangladesh engages in national reform discussions, the structural marginalisation of Indigenous peoples in the CHT remains largely unaddressed. This divergence between national reform discourse and local exclusion illustrates the complexity of transitional political moments. Without explicit attention to minority inclusion and regional autonomy, reform processes risk reproducing existing hierarchies rather than transforming them.
Communal Tensions and Regional Security Dynamics
The CHT is shaped not only by domestic politics but also by regional dynamics. The ongoing Rohingya crisis along the Myanmar border has intensified securitisation narratives. Reports of armed group activity and cross-border movement contribute to the framing of the region as a volatile frontier. According to the PCJSS report, incidents involving Rohingya armed groups have affected Indigenous communities in Bandarban.
At the same time, communal tensions between Indigenous Jumma communities and Bengali settlers have escalated in certain areas. The 2025 report documents large scale communal attacks and arson incidents that resulted in deaths, injuries, and destruction of property. In several cases, Indigenous protesters were reportedly criminalised while accountability for violence remained unclear.
These developments illustrate how security discourses, demographic contestation, and political mobilisation intersect. When Indigenous protest is interpreted through a security lens, it reinforces a cycle in which demands for rights are recast as threats to national stability rather than recognised as legitimate political grievances.
International Engagement and Ground Realities
Bangladesh continues to engage with international human rights mechanisms and has responded to communications from United Nations Special Procedures. From a diplomatic perspective, this engagement signals openness to dialogue and international cooperation.
At the same time, Indigenous representatives from the Chittagong Hill Tracts have also sought to raise their concerns through international advocacy channels. The Jumma peoples became members of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) in 1993. Since then, UNPO has consistently raised concerns regarding the situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts through regional and international human rights mechanisms, while supporting Jumma representatives in engaging with these platforms and bringing attention to issues such as militarisation, land dispossession, and the incomplete implementation of the Peace Accord.
However, documentation from the ground indicates persistent patterns of arrest, land occupation, restrictions on livelihood, and violence against women. The gap between international engagement and local experience highlights a broader challenge. Engagement with global institutions can coexist with entrenched local power structures. For Indigenous communities in the CHT, the central issue remains political recognition, land rights, and meaningful participation in governance. Without progress on these structural questions, international dialogue may have limited impact on everyday realities.
Conclusion
The situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in 2025 reflects the enduring consequences of an unfinished peace process. The 1997 Accord established a framework for decentralisation and land justice, yet core provisions remain unrealised. The Yunus-led interim government has opened a broader conversation about reform, but Indigenous communities in the Hills continue to face militarisation, land pressure, and limited political inclusion.
International attention, including through United Nations Joint Allegation Letters, has increased scrutiny of land grabbing and governance practices. At the same time, advocacy efforts by Indigenous representatives have continued to raise awareness of these issues within regional and international human rights forums.
Nevertheless, durable change depends on domestic political will and the implementation of commitments already made. The CHT therefore stands as a critical test of whether national reform processes can meaningfully address deeply rooted territorial and identity-based conflicts.
Sustainable stability in the Hills requires more than security management. It requires meaningful autonomy, land restitution, and institutional accountability. Until these foundations are addressed, the distance between reform narratives and lived realities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts will likely persist.